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RESTORING SEPARATION OF POWERS
IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Martin S. Flaherty*
INTRODUCTION
This essay addresses the issue of how separation of powers relates to the
domestic enforcement of international human rights standards in the face of
opposition from the President. Specifically, I consider the role of the
judiciary in defending international human rights standards when the
Executive branch invokes its ostensible foreign relations expertise against
them.
Nowhere has such conflict arisen more sharply than in the cases arising
from the attacks of 9/11. Three scenarios have stood out. First, the
President and Supreme Court have joined issue over statutes implicating
human rights commitments. Notable in this regard is Justice Souter’s
concurrence in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, in which he bolstered his reading of the
Non-Detention Act with reference to Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention.1 Second, the judiciary has challenged the executive more
directly on issues of treaty interpretation. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Justice
Stevens’ majority opinion summarily rejected the Bush administration’s
idiosyncratic argument that “unlawful enemy combatants” were not entitled
to the protections of the same treaties’ Common Article 3.2 Lastly, the
Court has refused to set aside constitutional principles at the executive’s
behest in the name of national security. Not least, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
the Court rejected the President’s arguments for a restrictive reading of
Guantanamo detainees’ Constitutional Due Process rights.3 Though here
the parallel international standards operated offstage in U.S. Reports, they
did make a significant appearance in amicus briefs.4 No less important, the
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1
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 549–50 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that even if Hamdi was not
entitled to the protections of the Non-Detention Act, as the President claimed, he is entitled
to the rights of a “prisoner of war” under Article 5 of the Geneva Convention).
2
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (rejecting the President’s determination
that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention was inapplicable to members of al
Qaeda).
3
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 524–35 (establishing that a citizen-detainee’s classification as an
enemy combatant did not deprive him of the right to know the basis for his detention).
4
See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Global Rights Supporting Petitioners, Hamdi, 542
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Court refused to consider only Article II’s national security concerns at the
expense of the Fifth Amendment.5
In short, the Court has stood up to the President to “say what the law is”
even in foreign affairs areas that directly or indirectly implicate
international human rights.6 However, any note of triumph, at least for
advocates of human rights and judicial independence, would be premature.
For one thing, the Court’s rulings rarely made any difference to the actual
litigants.7 The 9/11 decisions could have gone further by referencing
international standards more forcefully. More importantly, the decisions
reflected a conflicted Court. The rulings themselves were closely split, and
the Court’s dicta emphasized deference to the Executive branch when the
law implicates foreign relations concerns.8
My contention is that to be faithful to the concept of separation of
powers as it is implemented by the United States Constitution – and more
generally applied by most governments around the world – domestic courts
that are properly seized of applicable international human rights standards
or that have the option to interpret the law with reference to these standards,
should do so with zero deference to the views of the Executive branch. This
approach expands upon a long-standing project I have been undertaking that
aims one day to appear as a monograph.9
U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696) (2004) (arguing that the government’s arbitrary detention of
Hamdi violated U.S. obligations under the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and customary international law).
5
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535–39 (rejecting the Government’s assertion that the courts
must defer to the Executive’s national security interests and forgo any examination of
individual due process rights).
6
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
7
Martin S. Flaherty, Human Rights Law, American Justice, and the “War on Terror,
25 OAH MAG. OF HIST., 35, 35–40 (2011).
8
See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531 (plurality opinion) (stressing that the Constitution
devolves responsibility over strategic wartime decisions to the Executive branch because it
is best positioned and most politiclaly accounable for making such decisions); see also id.
at 533–34 (plurality opinion) (allowing hearsay evidence and a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the government’s position because enemy-combatant proceedings place a burden
on the executive during military conflict); see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 679 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court has interpreted certain Article II provisions as bestowing
broad powers on the President with respect to foreign relations and matters of national
security).
9
See Martin S. Flaherty, More Real Than Apparent: Separation of Powers, The Rule
of Law, and Comparative Executive “Creativity”in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 2005-2006 (2006) (exchange with John Yoo); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch Abroad, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2006) [exchange with Michael
Ramsey]; see also Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of SelfGovernment, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 477 (2006).

ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 2, No. 1
& COMPARATIVE LAW

24

Given this focus, I do not discuss several issues. Although I advocate
for the United States to sign onto and ratify human rights treaties, I do not
discuss these policy-making decisions here. Nor do I address the problem of
reservations, understandings and declarations that curtail the applicability of
those human rights norms, which I predictably oppose in most instances.
With regard to both points, I am proud to channel the late, great Louis
Henkin.10
I.

ZERO DEFERENCE: WHY COURTS SHOULD PERSEVERE IN THE
INTERPRETATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

To illustrate my argument that courts should persevere in the
interpretation of international law without deference to the executive
branch, consider the following hypothetical. Imagine that the Court is
making a decision regarding a controversial criminal statute. It may be
analyzing the statute’s constitutionality, applying canons of statutory
interpretation or evaluating it with reference to customary international law.
Now, let's say the Executive branch asserts that based on institutional
capacity and expertise, the courts should not interpret the law
independently. Instead, courts should defer to the Executive branch’s
interpretation of what the criminal law is in light of its unique and distinct
expertise in criminal law enforcement. Compared to the sheltered courts,
the Executive branch is more familiar with the reality of criminal law – the
statistics behind the issues, the reality of dealing with criminals, and how
the law operates in the real world.
I would like to think that most people agree that this is a weak argument
in the criminal law context. We would expect and want courts to
independently interpret criminal statutes or constitutional provisions with
respect to criminal law. That is, we expect the courts to interpret the law
through conventional legal materials without any particular deference to the
Executive branch or to those attempting to enforce the law. Indeed, our
instincts tell us that giving deference to the executive in that situation
profoundly cuts against basic rule of law norms.
Yet the Executive branch makes precisely the same argument when it
comes to treaty interpretation, statutes and constitutional provisions relevant
to international law. The argument is that the executive branch has a
distinct and unique institutional capacity to deal with foreign affairs and
10

See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990) (extolling domestic and
transnational human rights enforcement).
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foreign relations that deserves deference from the courts. In the
international law context, this argument has not only long been treated as
plausible, but, in dicta, seems to have been gaining on the Court itself – at
least until the 9/11 cases.11 Moreover, versions of this approach have
appeared across an array of doctrines implicating foreign relations matters.
Deference to the executive has been floated not just with regard to statutes,
treaties, and the Constitution, as noted. It also appears in areas such as
political question doctrine12 and sovereign immunity.13
A. Treaty Interpretation
The argument with respect to treaty interpretation has been that courts
need to defer to executive interpretations, even when they implicate
individual rights. Some commentators may argue that this claim has
already more or less coalesced as doctrine. A closer look at the case law,
however, confirms that this assertion is more apparent than real. In fact, the
Supreme Court has interpreted treaties in an independent way using
conventional interpretive materials.14 Only then has it occasionally added
11

See Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 119, 151 (2011/2012) (referring to the weight of deferential entitlement that
executive construction of rights rendered under the Geneva Convention).
12
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962) (compelling a suit to be non-justiciable
due to the presence of a political question); see also Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,
495 (1969) (presenting non-justiciable litigation in the court because of the involvement of
a political question).
13
The Supreme Court suggested that the views of the State Department with regard to
foreign sovereign immunity had special relevance. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct.
2278, 2291 (2010) (holding that the State Department maintains a role in determining
individual official immunity); see also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35–
36 (1945) (suggesting that the courts respect the executive determination to treat a foreign
vessel as immune, an idea that was later formalized in the “Tate Letter” (Letter of Jack B.
Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, to the Acting Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman (May 19,
1952), in 26 DEP’T STATE BULL 984 (1952)); see also Beth Stephens, The Modern
Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669, 2710 (2011)
(evaluating the deference given to the Executive branch in determining foreign official
immunity).
14
See Eastern Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 536, nn. 3–4 (1991) (suggesting that the
simplest method of determining the proper meaning of a word in foreign legal text would
be to consult a bilingual dictionary); see also Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano,
457 U.S. 176, 184–85 n.4 (1982) (noting that the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by
Government agencies is not conclusive; see also Anthony C. Arend, Who’s Afraid of the
Geneva Conventions? Treaty Interpretation in the Wake of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 22 AM.
U. INT’L L. REV.709, 725–26 (2007) (explaining that the Supreme Court’s reasonably wellestablished approach to treaty interpretation begins with giving words their ordinary
meaning).
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that its conclusions comport with what the executive branch has said, and
that the executive’s views are owed some “weight.”15 That is why the
doctrine currently remains more apparent than real. Yet it is also a doctrine
that appears en route to becoming more and more real, and so will likely do
more and more work as time goes on. That said, at least the terrorism cases
suggest that this trend is not inexorable.
There are two basic, yet very different sets of arguments against
deference to the Executive branch in treaty interpretation, which combine to
make what I believe is a dispositive case. One set entails backward-looking
reasons – in two words, original understanding. The other involves
forward-looking claims that in my mind are more novel and interesting. In
this regard, restoring to the courts a robust role in international human rights
enforcement comports with a proper appreciation of recent ideas and
analysis in international relations.
1. Original Understanding: the Founders as Internationalists
With regard to original understanding, what must suffice for the
moment is a grand conclusory assertion: the Founders were
internationalists. They were internationalists, in part because they were
establishing what was at the time a weak would-be republic. Then as now,
such republics tend to like international law, which. That commitment
assumed special urgency under the Articles of Confederation. 16 Though
underappreciated today, one of the urgencies motivating constitutional
reform in the 1780s was the states’ failure to implement domestic individual
rights secured by international law – a failure that in turn threatened to
plunge the new nation into renewed international hostilities.17 The result
15

See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (stating that although the
Executive branch is afforded some weight, courts interpret treaties for themselves); see
also Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 119, 128 (2011/2012) (declaring that leading cases often give great weight to the
executive interpretations of relevant treaties); see also Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty
Interpretation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 777, 779 (2008) (arguing that the current doctrine of
judicial deference to executive treaty interpretation is “obtuse” and unclear).
16
See David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulseboch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, The Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition,
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 935 (2010) (asserting that the United States’ priority in
constitution-making was to create a respectable nation in the eyes of the international
community).
17
See JAMES A. CURRY, RICHARD B. RILEY & RICHARD M. BATTISONI,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 55–56 (5th ed. 2003)
(describing state conditions and noting that the faiulre to secure individual rights led to
reforms in the 1780s); see also Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship,
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was a Constitution with a central commitment to the enforcement of these
norms by domestic courts.
There are two striking examples, the most obvious of which is the
Supremacy Clause.18 By this provision, the Founders sought to ensure that
treaties would be self-executing – that is judicially enforceable – in Federal
and state courts. This approach came about as a direct response of the
states’ refusal to implement not just any treaty, but the Treaty of Paris
ending the War of Independence. Articles 4 and 6 of that Treaty established
individual rights for British creditors and loyalists respectively.19 The other
example comes from work by Professor David Sloss, which shows how the
Supremacy Clause was implemented.20 Specifically, Sloss looks at treaty
cases in the early Republic that involve denials by the executive that treatybased rights were infringed. And in all of those cases, Sloss finds that in no
case did the courts defer in any way to the Executive branch, either in word
or deed.21 In short, to be true to our Founding ideas and practices, when it
comes to the interpretation of international law properly before the courts –
especially with regard to individual rights claims – the executive is entitled
to exactly zero deference.
2. Imbalance of Power: The Executive in International Relations
Now consider the “forward-looking” international relations concept.
This idea rests on innovative work by such scholars as Robert Keohane,22
Joseph Nye,23 and Anne-Marie Slaughter.24 In various ways, they have
explored the insight that it not longer suffices to think of foreign affairs as
primarily that story of sovereign nation states acting upon one another as
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2122–23, 2125 (1999) (arguing that
domestic misapprehensions in the treaty-making process may have affected the body’s role
in foreign affairs).
18
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
19
See THE DEFINITIVE TREATY OF PEACE, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, art. 6, Sept. 3, 1783, 8
Stat. 80 (declaring that creditors right to collect debts shall be valid but prosecutions and
confiscations relating to the Revolutionary War shall cease and be void).
20
See David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A
Historical Perspective, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 495, 498–99 (2007) (positing that, in
relation to Executive authority, the Judiciary has exhibited zero deference to the Exeuctive
branch in the first decades of the Republic).
21
See id. (contending that the Constitution does not require the judiciary to defer to the
executive branch on issues of treaty interpretation).
22
See ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977).
23
See id.
24
See ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).

28

ST. JOHN’S JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL [Vol. 2, No. 1
& COMPARATIVE LAW

monoliths. Instead, they argue, sovereignty has become increasingly
disaggregated. By this they mean that more and more the key interactions
between nations come at the level of governmental sub-units: executive
regulators, judges, and legislators. And those sub-units tend to track the
classic division found in the separation of powers.
Start with the executive. Increasingly, nation states interact via members
of their Executive branches, not on the cabinet level, but instead on the level
of regulators, administrators, and enforcement officers.25 In simplest terms,
such officials meet simply to network, or to use a New York term,
“schmooze.” Often they share information to aid in respective rules
generation or enforcement.
At times they form or make use of
organizations on a sub-cabinet level.
Judges, too, directly interact with one another across borders. This also
involves schmoozing, through international get-togethers such as the Aspen
Institute or through various academic venues, such as those run for
Ghanaian judges by the Leitner Center in New York. An even more
prominent method is what one might call the “international shout out,”
through judges citing one another’s case law. Some courts and judges are
routinely cosmopolitan; others less so.26 Yet even among U.S. judges, who
tend to be on the less internationalist side, the practice appears here to
stay.27 Regardless of the method, judicial globalization, as executive
globalization, permits sharing of information and expertise with a resulting
mutual empowerment.
Legislators participate in this type globalization as well. They too
travel, meet with their counterparts, share information, and at times
undertake joint initiatives. Here, however, collective action problems and
party turnover tend to diffuse the benefits to respective legislative bodies.
25

See Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in
Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 243, 254
(2010) (explaining that states are disaggregating into functionally distinct parts such as
courts, regulatory agencies, and legislatures in order to deal with global issues); see also
David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 563, 575 (2008) (claiming that networks allow domestic officials to interact
with their foreign counterparts directly, without the need for supervision by foreign offices
or senior Executive branch officials).
26
For an example from one of the more cosmopolitan courts, see Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Assocs, [2011] H.K.C.F.A.R., Final Appeals Nos. 5, 6, &
7 of Civil 2010 (CFA) (Bokhary, J.).
27
See Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, 20
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 477, 491 (2006) (recognizing that US judges are increasingly looking
to international materials in deciding domestic cases); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1003, 1117–19 (2000) (discussing several U.S.
Supreme Court Justices’ tendencies to use foreign law as persuasive authority).
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Legislative bodies are simply too large and too unstable for interaction
between legislators to result in benefits on the same scale as with the
administrators and judges.28
For all their insight, there is one thing international relations scholars do
not ask, and that is how these different sub-units of any given government
fare relative to one another in light of the type of globalization they
describe. Put in more conventional legal terms: How does modern
international relations affect the balance among the branches of government
that is at the core of separation of powers? That question is critical to the
extent any constitutional democracy embraces the doctrine. It is therefore
important even in parliamentary systems, insofar as judicial authority is
meant to serve as a counterbalance to the usual mixture of legislative and
executive authority evident in a ministerial government comprised of
legislators. The question becomes even clearer in a system like the United
States, in which the legislature, executive, and judiciary are designed to be
relatively independent and co-equal.29
My increasingly educated guess is that the relative winner emerging
from modern foreign relations are executives the world over. They are
better placed to interact with, and so empower, one another than reactive
judiciaries, which remain generally reactive, or legislatures, which suffer
from obvious collective action problems. Concerns borne of 9/11 have only
strengthened the executive hand that much more, as is true any time
national security fears spike. Running substantially behind in second, it
turns out, is the judiciary, which appears to be less hampered by collective
action difficulties than legislatures. Which means that lawmakers come in a
far distant third and last place.
As a descriptive matter, then, international relations disproportionately
enhance executive power, at the expense of legislative as well as judicial
power, throughout the world. Two aspects of this phenomenon should
cause concern, if not alarm, especially in combination.
First,
globalization’s comparative enhancement of executive authority comes in a
context in which at least the American executive is powerful well beyond
any original expectations, and has been augmenting power at a dizzying
rate.30
28

See ANN-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 106 (2004) (acknowledging
the difficulty in achieveing cohesiveness among legislators on a global scale).
29
See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1784
(1996) (describing how the Constitutionally mandated separation of powers serves
fundamental goals of balance, accountability and improves government efficiency).
30
See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE END OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 84 (2010)
(highlighting the growing power of the Executive branch); see also Aida Torres Perez, The
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CONCLUSION
Which at last brings me to my normative conclusion. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, the last rather than first place that courts should defer
to the executive is in cases in which the law implicates foreign relations.
That conclusion follows from venerable tenets of separation of powers that
we have somehow forgotten, as well as modern pressures on that doctrine
that we do not yet fully appreciate. Today, we must recall that among the
preeminent Founding ideas was a basic balance among the branches, not to
mention primacy in their respective fields, and that this conception was held
nowhere more strongly than in relation to judicial resolution of legal matters
affecting foreign relations. We need to appreciate that the dynamics of
modern foreign relations work to further empower executives in general,
and the American executive in particular, exacerbating an imbalance that
has already long been pronounced.
The time to learn these lessons is now. Already the courts have parroted
presidentialist rhetoric concerning judicial foreign affairs rhetoric. But they
have yet to make that rhetoric a reality. Should they do so, one more key
check on executive power will have been discarded in an area in which it
was supposed to have been entrenched, and in which it has never been
needed more. Checks such as judicial independence in foreign relations
may be destined to pass away. Yet as Justice Jackson proclaimed, “it is the
duty of the Court to be the last, not the first, to give them up.”31

Internationalization of Lawmaking Processes: Constraining or Empowering the
Executive?, 14 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 1, 8–9 (2006) (stating that internationalization
provides a unique opportunity for the expansion of the Executive branch power).
31
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 634, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (emphasizing the importance of maintaining checks on executive power).

